The significance of Iran's non-participation in the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit goes beyond the internal conflict between hardliners and reformists. Rather, Iran's non-participation in the summit is linked to how Tehran manages its relationship with Washington DC, its interests in the Middle East, and the position of Arab states in these negotiations, especially since Iran has traditionally dealt with the US bilaterally rather than within a multilateral regional framework.

A conflict erupted within Iran between hardliners and reformists over the correctness or wrongness of the Iranian decision not to participate in the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit on Gaza, with some viewing it as a missed opportunity and others viewing it as correct. 

There are certainly two motives: the first is tactical, linked to Iranian interests, and the other is linked to Iran's mentality when dealing with both Arab states and Washington. Despite Tehran receiving an invitation from Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to attend the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit to sign the Gaza agreement, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said in a post on the X platform that "neither President Pezeshkian nor I can deal with our counterparts who have attacked the Iranian people and continue to threaten us and impose sanctions on us," referring to the US.

The post appears as if Iran is using the US as a pretext, but this is a nonsensical excuse. For more than a month, Iranian officials have sought meetings with their American counterparts at the United Nations in New York, and Steve Witkoff did not attend.

Iran also responded to US President Donald Trump's speech in the Israeli Knesset, when he said: "The peace agreement between Israel and Gaza would not have been possible without the US bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities," adding that he believes Iran is ready to strike its own deal. “Even for Iran, whose regime has inflicted so much death in the Middle East, the hand of friendship and cooperation are open, and I can tell you that they want to reach an agreement”, he said. 

What is Iran’s position?

The Iranian Foreign Ministry then responded to Trump's statements, condemning them as false accusations, and the US president's irresponsible and shameful allegations regarding Iran.

Trump's statements could be understood, on the one hand, as a boast about achieving a military strike against Tehran, even if it did not completely eliminate the Iranian nuclear program, as he previously claimed. On the other hand, Trump believes that the US strike is what prompted Iran to support the ceasefire proposal in Gaza and persuade Hamas to accept the agreement.

Trump may also have exaggerated when he asked Iran to officially recognise Israel's existence and, for the second time, to join the Abraham Accords, i.e., establish political relations with Israel. Araghchi responded that what Trump is asking for is impossible. He said this is this the case because the Iranian regime, which was established in 1979, had as its primary legitimacy hostility towards Israel. 

According to this argument, Iran cannot join the Abraham Accords, even if Tehran concludes secret deals with Israel, as occurred during the 1980s in the so-called Iran-Contra scandal. Iran has long made clear to Hamas that its tacit acceptance of the ceasefire agreement reached by the movement includes the release of all remaining hostages in Gaza.

Trump asserts that the US believes in dialogue. However, although Iran responded that it was open to constructive dialogue it boycotted the Sharm El-Sheikh summit. The clear implication of Iran's failure to participate in the summit is that it does not want to appear eager for negotiations and dialogue with Trump, especially since he affirmed the US’s desire for dialogue during his speech before the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament. Certainly, Iran wanted to demonstrate that it was not seeking negotiations in any form, but rather on its own terms.

There are two contentious issues to which any dialogue between Iran and the US will have to agree: zero enrichment and ballistic missiles.  Even reports have begun to emerge that Iran is willing to accept near-zero enrichment, i.e., 1 percent, instead of the 3.67 percent it had previously insisted on. Thus, although Iran has good relations with Egypt and wants to negotiate with Trump, it saw non-participation as a way to strengthen its position in potential negotiations.

Iran's decision not to participate reflected the internal debate between reformists and hardliners. The reformists viewed the boycott as a missed opportunity to enter into dialogue with the US, while the hardliners considered doing so as a reflection of Iran's regional position, which is its rejection of the two-state solution as the basis for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Iran is also trying to justify its non-participation by claiming that it does not indicate a weakening of its regional influence or international isolation. This is the case even though some within the country have criticised Iran's absence from the summit as a sign of its diminished regional influence. This compares to the presence of other parties such as Indonesia and Pakistan.

‍

Photo: The US and Iran are at loggerheads (by Adobe)